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This article examines the public debate over marriage law to investigate how
arguments based on claims about what is natural privilege some relationships
while stigmatizing others and justifying discriminatory policies toward sexual
minorities. Articles about same-sex marriage appearing in major newspapers were
content-coded according to absence or presence of four dimensions of naturalness:
change over time, norms, procreation, and welfare of children. Arguments invoking
change over time were most frequent (39%), and procreation appeared least (10%).
The use of arguments based on the moral status of marriage was associated
with the use of each of the four dimensions based on naturalness. Mentions of
race, including comparisons to racial struggles, appeared in 20% of the articles,
making them just as common as child welfare. Results are discussed in terms of
the power of the concept of naturalness to legitimize and maintain privilege, and
the intersectionality of race and sexual orientation.
Peggy McIntosh’s foundational paper on privilege (1988) is most often dis-
cussed as an interrogation of how unearned advantages make whiteness invisible;
however, McIntosh also observed that other groups enjoy analogous advantages
and she offered a short list of heterosexual privileges similar to her well-known
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inventory comprising the “invisible knapsack” of whiteness. Although McIntosh
did not explicitly name legal marriage as one of the benefits, she did point out
that heterosexual privilege makes men and women who form households together
seem “normal” and that onlookers feel no need to question such arrangements
(Pratto & Stewart, 2012). In other words, a key tool in the knapsack of hetero-
sexual privilege is the entrenched and nearly unassailable assumption that such
relationships are natural.
However, in the United States the past decade has seen a flurry of legal and
political activity aimed on one side to reconsider, and on the other, to fortify
the contours of marriage law. As of October 2011, Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Iowa, Vermont, New Hampshire, and New York are the only U.S. states that issue
marriage licenses to same-sex couples (in addition to the District of Columbia),
whereas 37 states have statutes defining marriage as between one man and one
woman (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2011). Indeed, contests over
the legal recognition of same-sex relationships are taking place around the world
(Fingerhut, Riggle, & Rostosky, 2011), even as the forms these controversies take
are culturally specific (e.g., van Zyl, 2011). Clearly, we are at a moment when het-
erosexual privilege is highly visible and contested (Montgomery & Stewart, 2012).
In public debates about marriage, the idea of naturalness has often been
used to privilege opposite-sex, and earlier, same-race, relationships and to jus-
tify discrimination against sexual and racial minorities. Cohen’s (1997) definition
of heteronormativity highlights how perceptions of what is natural play a role
in maintaining privilege: “[heteronormativity consists of] localized practices and
centralized institutions that legitimize and privilege heterosexuality and heterosex-
ual relationships as fundamental and ‘natural’ within society” (p. 440). Indeed, in
many U.S. states, laws banning nonprocreative sexual behavior, including homo-
sexual behavior, sometimes termed the offending acts as “crimes against nature”
(Curtis & Gilreath, 2008).
The rhetorical invocation of what is natural as a justification for exclusionary
marriage policies appears largely unchanged in marriages debates in the U.S.
separated by more than 40 years. Laws against interracial marriage were found
to be unconstitutional in 1967 by the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Loving v.
Virginia. From today’s vantage point, the arguments against interracial marriage,
which typically invoked the concept of naturalness grounded in either the rhetoric
of science (Newman, 2004) or religion, starkly demonstrate the degree to which the
idea of the natural is socially constructed and historically contingent. For example,
a dissenting opinion in an early interracial marriage case used expert testimony
to conclude “crossing of the primary races leads gradually to retrogression and
eventual extinction of the resultant type unless it is fortified by reunion with the
parent stock” (Newman, 2004 p. 539), a view that most today would view as
motivated by racism rather than scientific objectivity.
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This study explores the ways naturalness arguments have been used recently
to privilege heterosexual marriage, thus justifying discrimination against sexual
minorities in the public debates about marriage. We reviewed scholarship on the
history of the controversies regarding same-sex and interracial marriage to identify
argumentative dimensions based on the concept of naturalness and then used
empirical methods to assess the prevalence of each argument in recent newspaper
accounts of the legal and political controversies concerning same-sex marriage.
In addition, we coded the articles for arguments concerning the moral status of
marriage and mentions of race to assess the relative use of these arguments, and
to examine whether these other types of arguments systematically occurred in
articles with naturalness rhetoric.
Naturalistic Fallacy
Marriage policy arguments that invoke naturalness often rely on a naturalistic
fallacy. This fallacy takes the form “what is natural is morally good,” and is
fallacious because there is no logical basis for the claim that moral positions
(what ought to be) follow from descriptions of nature (what is). Friedrich (2005)
found that many students made naturalistic fallacy errors when quizzed about the
implications of a research report, and this tendency increased when they were
asked to recall the report three weeks after reading it. To the extent that this fallacy
is widespread, arguments based on claims about the naturalness of certain unions
will be effective.
Scholarship on the history of justifications for marriage law might be un-
derstood in terms of the naturalistic fallacy in practice. Pascoe (2009) detailed
the history of how U.S. miscegenation law paralleled local perceptions of which
races were viewed as naturally inferior. In the North and South laws prohibited
marriages between Blacks and Whites, whereas in the West, the extensive list
of “races” prohibited from marrying Whites included American Indian, Chinese,
Japanese, and Hindu. In contrast, in the recent same-sex marriage debates much
attention has been paid to social science research in attempts to establish what
type of household fosters positive child development. Newman (2004) drew par-
allels between the use of pseudo-scientific research in support of miscegenation
laws and the use of social science research purporting that two opposite sex
parents are necessary for children’s sex role development to oppose same-sex
marriage in court cases. Both arguments commit the naturalistic fallacy as they
contend that because racial difference/gender differentiation is natural, marriage
law should permit only unions that maintain this difference/differentiation. Thus,
the naturalistic fallacy represents a mechanism to explain why rhetorical argu-
ments premised on the concept of naturalness can be expected to be common and
persuasive.
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The Symbolism of the Natural
In her discussion of the use of “the natural” in relation to sexology, Tiefer
(1995) adopted Williams’ (1983) explanation of the concept of “nature” to explain
its dynamic and powerful rhetorical application to issues of gender and sexual-
ity. Williams noted that the term nature “is perhaps the most complex word in
the language” (p. 291), and has multiple meanings rooted in both historical and
contemporary use. The term is sometimes used to refer to an essential character
of something, that is, a metaphor for bedrock or foundation. Bennett, Grossberg,
and Morris (2005) noted that this sense of the term implies that what is natural is
immutable and fixed. Nature also is used to describe an inherent force, suggesting
an inviolable order or plan, as in the idea of “mother nature” or intelligent design.
As well, the term is used to refer to the material and tangible world, and things
considered natural in this way are thought to be distinct from culture or human
creation. Taken together, these three meanings imbue the idea of the “natural” with
tremendous rhetorical authority to legitimize anything so deemed (Tiefer, 1995).
The rhetorical use of “the natural” is evident in popular texts and the discourse
of both laypeople and experts related to such topics as menstruation (Gunsen,
2010), breastfeeding (Locke, 2009), sex and marriage (McMillan, 2004), and love
(Martin & Kayzak, 2009). Lock and Kaufert (1998) argued that naturalness is
strategically deployed in discourse about institutions, relationships, and identities
to reinforce and challenge existing power structures. In each of these examples, as-
sertions about what is natural are used to legitimize whatever behavior is privileged
as correct, healthy, and untainted by “unnatural” influences.
In particular, in issues of marriage, love, and sex, “natural” arguments are
used to constrain and differentiate. For example, McMillan’s study of the Chinese
marital sex self-help literature (2004) found “healthy” sex was strictly demarcated
into what is natural and unnatural using pseudo-scientific arguments about natural
behavior to imply what is “appropriate,” “healthy,” and “moral” sex: heterosexual,
married, with traditional gender roles and cultural norms enforced. Heterosexual
love is also exalted as natural in Disney animated films for children (Martin &
Kayzak, 2009). When characters of different sexes fall in love in these films they
are visually depicted in settings suffused with imagery of the natural environment,
including “fireflies, butterflies, sunsets, wind, and the beauty and power of na-
ture . . . ” (p. 325). In Disney films, the heterosexual love is so natural that all of
surrounding nature comes alive and in synchronization with the music to celebrate
the characters’ love. These visual tropes emphasize the naturalness of the love on
display.
However, the shifting rhetoric of the natural can be negotiated to either con-
strain or liberate; it has the authority to discriminate “normal” from “deviant”
or to empower the oppressed. Sullivan-Blum (2006) found that in the debate
over legitimacy of homosexuality and gay marriage between Christian conser-
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vatives and liberals, both used rhetoric about natural behavior to support their
positions. Liberal Christians deployed naturalness arguments to support same-sex
marriage, claiming homosexuality was inborn, thus natural. In contrast, conser-
vative Christians simultaneously gave evidence for the naturalness of hetero-
sexuality and opposite-sex couplings to deny legitimacy of homosexuality and
same-sex marriage. Sullivan-Blum (2006) also addressed the experiences of ho-
mosexual churchgoers and discovered that they too utilized naturalness arguments,
but some were troubled by the restrictive quality of this rhetoric because it misrep-
resented their experiences as sexual minorities. For example, bisexuality, fluidity
of sexual orientation over time, and nonmonogamous sexual behaviors were re-
pressed, ignored, and constrained in the discourse of the natural. She concludes
that employing arguments of “‘nature’ simplifies the lived experiences of sexual
desire in order to make of it useful arguments and representations. Such sim-
plification, however, ignores or renders invisible portions of sexual experience
to the detriment of LGBT Christians” (p. 213). Thus, although the rhetoric of
the natural can be used to marshal support or opposition for sexual minorities
and policies that benefit them, this research suggest such discourse comes at a
price.
Argumentative Dimensions of Naturalness in the Marriage Debates
Based on review of the scholarship on the history of marriage law, four ar-
gumentative dimensions of naturalness were identified: change over time, norms,
procreation, and welfare of children. Arguments that engage the dimension of
“change over time” make claims about marriage arrangements as either fixed
across time and place, or else as a social institution that can either evolve over
time or differ across cultures. This argument is aligned with Williams’ (1983)
idea of nature as essential bedrock, immutable, and fixed. Yet Cott (2000) traced
the history of U.S. marriage law revealing how the institution is deeply linked
to cultural meanings of citizenship, and thus has been dramatically transformed,
particularly in response to the changing status of African Americans and women.
Thus, both arguments that support and those that challenge the legitimacy of
same-sex marriage may engage the issue of whether marriage changes over
time.
The idea that cultural “norms” that define deviance and depravity stem from
a natural order is aligned with Williams’ (1983) characterization of the natural
as suggesting an inherent force or plan that orders the world. Often these claims
are used to challenge changes to marriage laws through the use of the “slippery
slope” argument. For example, Cahill (2004) demonstrated that the specter of
allowing incest was used to discredit movements to legalize both interracial and
same-sex marriage. In fact, in the 19th century, the same term, “intermarriage,”
was used to refer to both interracial and intrafamilial marriage. Psychological
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research on disgust suggests that appeals to the natural will be powerful argu-
ments in the marriage debates. Disgust is naturalizing emotion that has been
linked with prejudice (Hodson & Costello, 2007) and the use of essentialism in
racist discourse (Holtz & Wagner, 2009). To their opponents, interracial sex and
marriage threaten to undo the boundary between races, and same-sex marriage
threatens the boundary between genders by challenging the idea of complemen-
tary gender norms (Greene, 2009). Cahill (2004) linked the parallels in legal and
political discourse between incest, sex across race, and sex within gender to the
psychological conceptualizations of disgust because the emotion is associated
with boundary violations.
Two other forms that naturalness arguments take in the marriage debates have
focused on procreation and the welfare of children. Crehan and Rickenbacker
(2007) found that arguments based on procreation/child welfare were prevalent
in coverage of same-sex marriage in both conservative and liberal publications
between 1996 and 2006; however, they did not make a distinction between these
two constructs. We argue this is a meaningful distinction because these arguments
use the idea of the natural in different ways. Claims about the naturalness of pro-
creation, which invoke the necessity of two people of different biological sexes
to reproduce, are aligned with the idea of nature as manifest in material reality
(Williams, 1983). Girgis, George, and Anderson (2010) made a typical argument
of this type: although each individual is a complete biological entity, to be com-
plete in the function of reproduction two opposite sex bodies must join through
intercourse. The authors argue that therefore committed sexual relationships be-
tween pairs of biologically male and female persons should be privileged as “real
marriage” (p. 252) over same-sex unions, though they explicitly included infer-
tile heterosexual couples under this rubric because they take the idealized form.
Arguments about procreation, grounded in assumptions of essential biological
difference, harken back to those made in the debate over interracial marriage that
Blacks were biological inferior to Whites and that intermarriage would compro-
mise the resulting offspring (Johnson, 2009; Pascoe, 2009).
In contrast, arguments about the welfare of children are associated with the
idea of nature as entailing an inviolable order or plan (Williams, 1983). These ar-
guments typically either affirm healthy outcomes for children raised by same-sex
couples (Kitzinger & Wilkinson, 2004), or claim that children from such fami-
lies suffer harm, including development of nonheterosexual sexual orientations
in adulthood or emotional trauma from stigma associated with homophobia. Of-
ten social science evidence is marshaled to support these claims. Sullivan-Blum
(2006) identified a similar line of argument in conversations with evangelical U.S.
Christians, who claimed that gender differences in sexuality were natural, and
heterosexual marriage is required to join men and women’s complementary na-
tures whereas taming men’s inborn predisposition for promiscuity by tying them
to family responsibilities.
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Invoking Morality and Race
Reading the literature on the marriage debates lead us to identify two other
argumentative dimensions that do not rely on the concept of the natural: (1)
those concerning the moral status of marriage, and (2) those mentioning racial
aspects of this debate, including comparisons to struggles for racial equality. First,
arguments about the moral status of marriage are of interest because, as Johnson
(2009) observed, religious arguments have been used in court cases pertaining to
both interracial marriage and same-sex marriage (see Blumenfeld & Jaekel, 2012
for a discussion of Christian influence on secular U.S. institutions). In an early
decision (1959) leading up to Loving v. Virginia, Judge Leon Bazile famously
argued: “Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, Malay and red, and
he placed them on separate continents. . . . the fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix.” More recently, the pronouncement that
“God made Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve,” has been repeated countless
times in opposition to same-sex marriage (a recent Google search turned up 23,200
websites including the phrase), and Crehan and Rickenbacker (2007) found that
similar arguments increased in prevalence in Conservative publications between
1996 and 2006.
Second, same-sex marriage may be legitimated or challenged by comparison
to race, either directly, by invoking the legal controversy over interracial marriage,
or indirectly, by comparing the struggle for rights for sexual minorities to struggles
for racial justice. The literature addressing the marriage debates within critical race
and sexuality studies troubles the simple analogy between interracial and same-
sex marriage. For example, Novkov (2008) examined the legal history of these
controversies to conclude that laws against interracial marriage were explicitly
intended to preserve a view of citizenship based on white supremacy; in contrast,
the laws preventing same-sex marriage mainly preserve gender norms and the
necessity of heterosexuality. Nevertheless discussion of race in relation to same-
sex marriage is often invoked in the mass media (e.g., Greene, 2009; Johnson,
2009; Pascoe, 2009).
This Study
To understand how the concept of naturalness has been used in public de-
bates about whether heterosexual relationships should be privileged by reserving
the right to legal marriage, we conducted a quantitative content analysis of the
argumentative dimensions present in coverage of same-sex marriage court cases
in Massachusetts and California in American newspapers between 2004 and 2008.
We coded four argumentative dimensions related to the naturalness of heterosex-
ual unions: Change over time, norms, procreation and child welfare. The articles
were also coded for arguments concerning race and the moral status of marriage.
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We investigated the following research questions: What is the relative prevalence
of the arguments that rely on the concept of certain unions as natural, and how
does their prevalence compare to arguments based on the moral status of marriage
and mentioning race? Are there systematic patterns in the appearance of natural-
ness arguments in the same articles that use arguments based on moral status and
comparison to race?
Method
We conducted a content analysis of articles from prominent national newspa-
pers covering the status of same-sex marriage in the U.S. states of Massachusetts
and California because they were the first to have legalized same-sex marriage.
In Goodrich v. Department of Public Health (2004), the Massachusetts Supreme
Court found that bans against same-sex marriage violated the equal protection
clauses of its state constitution (Samar, 2005). The California Supreme Court
challenged the constitutionality of state laws barring same-sex marriages In re
Marriage Cases (2008) (later that year California voters approved Proposition 8,
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples; this law is still being challenged in the
courts).
Selection of Newspapers and Articles
We compiled a systematic inventory of articles in major newspapers relating to
same-sex marriage cases in Massachusetts and California, during a time period of
intense public debate about marriage law. Using the top 100 daily newspapers in the
United States according to circulation from the Editor and Publisher International
Year Book (2008), 12 national newspapers with high-circulation rates were identi-
fied based on both circulatory prominence and regional proximity to the specified
same-sex marriage court cases. We coded articles from: USA Today, Wall Street
Journal, New York Times, New York Post, Washington Post, Houston Chronicle,
San Francisco Chronicle, Star Tribune, Star-Ledger, Boston Herald, and Los
Angeles Sentinel. Employing searches using the search terms “gay marriage” or
“same-sex marriage” and “California” or “Massachusetts” in the Lexis–Nexis and
Proquest Databases, 500 articles were identified from the periods between 2001–
2004 and 2004–2008, corresponding to the height of controversy leading to the
legalization of same-sex marriage in Massachusetts and California, respectively.
Coding
Two of the authors content-coded a random selection of approximately half
the articles in the database (N = 273) for six argumentative dimensions (described
below) according to presence (1) or absence (0). An advantage of using this binary
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coding strategy is that the inter-coder reliabilities are relatively high. A disadvan-
tage of binary data is that the coding involves more measurement error, and there is
a risk that correlations between such variables are lower than correlations between
ordinal or interval variables (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). The researchers dou-
ble coded a subsample of 37% of the articles (n = 100) in five separate iterations
throughout the coding process. Percent category agreement was computed by us-
ing the following formula from Winter (1973): (2 × the number of agreements on
the presence of a category) / (number of a particular coding category scored by
the coder A + number of a particular coding category scored by coder B). Percent
category agreement across the six categories was 86%.
Coding Criteria
Change over time was coded when statements argued or refuted that a given
marriage arrangement has existed for an immeasurable time, or reflects longstand-
ing (and thus, consensually agreed upon) practice. For example: “A marriage is
a man and woman, which we’ve had 5,000-odd years to affirm,” or “The defini-
tion of marriage is equally amenable to changing with the times. The concept is
about love and commitment, not gender.” We also coded claims and refutations
that traditional marriage arrangements are universal and practiced “around the
world.”
Norms. Claims and refutations that same-sex marriage is abnormal, deviant,
or disgusting were coded under this dimension, as were comparisons of homo-
sexuality or same-sex marriage to other forms of relationships that are presented
as implicitly immoral or unacceptable (e.g., incest, polygamy, or bestiality). For
example: “If gay marriage, why not group marriage or the legal union of blood
relations?” or “Why not pass a constitutional ban on polygamy? Or adultery? Both
erode the ‘sanctity of marriage.’”
Procreation was coded when statements used or challenged biological repro-
duction as a rationale for marriage, or when marriage was described as founded on
the biological complementarily of male and female bodies. Arguments that het-
erosexual marriage is not limited to people who are willing or able to reproduce
(e.g., infertile, aged, or voluntarily childless) were also coded. Examples include:
“[if same-sex marriage were legal] . . . marriage would be understood as domestic
partnership of two people linked by genital sex than as something associated with
a biological bond between parents and children,” or “[speaker] said the right to
marry ‘has never been limited to those who plan or desire to have children.’”
Welfare of children was coded when articles described particular marriage
arrangements as being healthy or preferred for raising children, or about the
implications of exposing children to homosexuality. For example: “Once you
stray too far from the idea that marriage is child-centered, you’re going to get into
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an endless series of contradictions,” or “ . . . professional groups say two parents,
whether heterosexual or homosexual, are preferable to single parent families.”
Moral status was coded whenever articles made moral judgments, includ-
ing citation of religious doctrine, as justification the appropriateness of marriage
arrangements. Most mentions of the word “sanctity” were coded under this di-
mension. For example: “If judges insist on forcing their arbitrary will upon the
people . . . Our nation must defend the sanctity of marriage.”
Discussion of race. Arguments that compared same-sex marriage to strug-
gles for racial equality, including interracial marriage (anti-miscegenation)
laws/debates, civil rights, segregation or the abolition of slavery were coded here,
as were any mention of racial aspects of this debate. For example: “ . . . same-sex
ruling relied heavily on the court’s 1948 decision on interracial marriage . . . the
court was far ahead of public opinion.” In addition, when comparisons were
made, coders noted whether the comparison was to interracial marriage or to other
struggles for racial equality.
Results
To assess the overall prevalence of arguments based on the concept of nat-
uralness, a variable was constructed for each article that was coded 1 when any
of the four dimensions related to natural were mentioned, and 0 if none of the
categories were mentioned. A majority of the articles (52%) included at least one
such dimension. Proportions of the articles in which each of the argumentative
dimensions appeared are presented in Table 1. Of the dimensions relying on the
concept of natural, change over time was mentioned in more than one-third of the
articles, making it the most frequently occurring argument in the dataset. Norms
and welfare of children were the next most common dimensions, each occurring in
about one-fifth of the articles. Arguments based on procreation occurred in only
one-tenth of the articles.
Interestingly, claims based on the stability of current marriage arrangements
(change) were invoked even more often than arguments based on religion (moral
status), which appeared in just under one third of the articles. Also of note was that
discussion of race appeared in one-fifth of the arguments, making it comparable in
prevalence to both norms and welfare of children. Examination of the content of the
arguments based on race revealed that of 36 articles in which comparisons to race
were made, there were nearly as many mentions of struggles to end segregation
and slavery (22) as there were comparisons to interracial marriage (24).
To investigate whether the argumentative dimensions tend to co-occur in the
same articles, we calculated the phi-coefficient of association (used in the case of
two dichotomous variables) between each dimension and every other (Table 1).
Two patterns emerged. First, use of moral status arguments was significantly
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Table 1. Prevalence of, and Associations between (Phi-coefficients), Argumentative Dimensions in
Same-Sex Marriage Articles
Variable Prevalence (%) 1 2 3 4 5 6
Argumentative dimensions based
on naturalness
Change over time 107 (39%)a –
Norms 62 (23%) .33∗∗ –
Procreation 28 (10%) .20∗∗ .08 –
Welfare of children 55 (20%) .30∗∗ .19∗∗ .34∗∗ –
Alternative argumentative
dimensions
Moral status 85 (31%) .28∗∗ .18∗∗ .27∗∗ .18∗∗ –
Discussion of race 55 (20%) .10 .10 .23∗∗ .16∗∗ .12 –
Note. Articles were selected using location specific search operators (California or Massachusetts),
and articles were coded as relating to California (N = 83), Massachusetts (N = 131), or other (N =
59). Total prevalence includes occurrence across all articles.
a Chi-Square analysis indicated that the change over time argument was used significantly more
frequently in articles about Massachusetts (46%) than about California (28%),  2 (1,214) = 6.07∗.∗p < .05 ∗∗p < .01. There were no differences by state on the other dimensions.
associated with all four dimensions based on conceptions of what is natural (change
over time, norms, procreation, and welfare of children). Second, discussion of race
was significantly associated with procreation and welfare of children.
Discussion
Content-coding of articles concerning same-sex marriage appearing in high-
circulation newspapers revealed that slightly more than half the articles coded
included at least one argument about the naturalness of certain relationships. De-
spite the acknowledgment among historians of the changing nature of marriage
over time (Cott, 2000), the most common type of naturalness argument observed
in these articles concerned the stability of current arrangements (one man, one
woman). Of the text coded under the category change over time, 90% of the re-
sponses concerned the temporal stability of marriage laws, while only 10% men-
tioned consistency of marriage traditions across cultures and religions. Reviewing
the text coded under change, we noted some thematic patterns. Many of the state-
ments attempted to quantify the span of time during which marriage had remained
unchanged (e.g., centuries-old, thousands of years, millennia). This rhetoric sug-
gests that the continuity of history has immense magnitude, even weight. Most
of the statements coded in this category argued by assertion rather than providing
evidence, and this was especially true for claims that marriage arrangements were
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invariant across cultures. Finally, these statements often characterized same-sex
marriage as inauthentic (using terms such as sham, counterfeit, and fake). These
claims implicitly—and sometimes, explicitly—invoke a binary with what is real
and natural (same-sex marriages “threaten to devalue the real thing”). One notable
statement claimed, “Disregarding of anthropological evidence and redrawing the
line of marriage to no longer be a man and a woman but simply just two consenting
adults result[s] in a line in the blowing sand.” Not only does this vivid imagery
highlight the sense of the natural entailing a planful force that organizes the world
(in contrast to an arbitrary line shifting in the sand), but also contrasts change in
marriage law to the ideal of nature as a foundation or bedrock, a metaphor we saw
repeatedly in text coded in this category. Those supporting same-sex marriage in-
voked this argumentative dimension much less often, and when they did, typically
it was to deny the legitimacy of tradition as a justification for setting policy in the
present, or to refute claims that change equated to social erosion.
The argument that marriage laws should continue unchanged from how they
are believed to always have been is based on the assumption that the status quo
should be privileged and that tradition is a social good. This line of rhetoric
may be popular, particularly among opponents of same-sex marriage, precisely
because it does not rely on religious justification, which may be challenged on
the grounds of either the particularity of any religious tradition or the separation
of church and state. The prevalence of the change over time argument is also
noteworthy because stability is a key concept in defining something as natural
rather than socially constructed and culturally dependent. This argumentation is
related to the “existence bias” (Eidelman, Crandall, & Pattershall, 2009) and the
“status quo bias” (Anderson, 2003). This research suggests a mechanism to explain
why naturalness should hold rhetorical power in relation to gender, the body and
sexuality as well as the institution of marriage.
Review of the text coded under the second most prevalent dimension, norms,
revealed this line of argument often took the form of the slippery slope, asserting
that legalization of same-sex marriage “could lead to a legalization of incest,
polygamy, or worse.” Although explicit statements of disgust were rare, those
using this argument to challenge same-sex marriage used words such as “sick,”
“impure,” “deviate,” and “sodomy,” and others compared the legal recognition of
same-sex unions to allowing crime such as prostitution and drug use, all suggesting
opprobrium. Interestingly, those supporting same-sex marriage also invoked this
dimension fairly often. Some of these statements were simple rejections of the
idea that same-sex unions were deviant; however, many other instances were
found in which anti-same-sex marriage policies were characterized as creating
“second-class citizens,” presumably beyond the “charmed circle” (Rubin, 1984)
surrounding privileged and acceptable sexuality.
Arguments based on the welfare of children were also common, appearing
in 20% of the articles. Review of text coded under this dimension suggested the
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typical arguments against same-sex marriage took two forms. One focused on the
necessity of parents of each sex for optimum child development; the second raised
concerns about exposing children to homosexuality, either through teaching them
that same-sex unions are acceptable, or allowing them to be raised by homosexuals,
whom these speakers implied were unfit to parent. This review also revealed
that child welfare was the only argumentative dimension in which supporters of
same-sex marriage commonly invoked the idea of the natural not to refute it, but
to support a separate line of argument. Many of these statements were claims
that recognition of same-sex marriage provided stability and legal protection for
children.
In contrast, arguments based on innate biological differences between the
sexes necessary for procreation appeared only half as often as child welfare. Most
often these arguments were used by those opposed to same-sex marriage, often
claiming that the purpose of sexuality is to unite male and female sexuality in
procreation, thus invoking the sense of the natural as rooted in material reality.
However, opponents also claimed this arrangement reflected a divine plan for cre-
ation. Thus this argumentative dimension engages two connotations of the natural
identified by Williams (1983). When used by proponents of same-sex marriage,
these arguments sometimes provided counterexamples to the claim that heterosex-
ual marriage exists primarily for procreation, as in the case of couples marrying
late in life or those who choose not to reproduce. It is also worth noting that
associations between the argumentative dimensions indicated that text coded as
procreation appeared in articles that also made arguments based on the moral sta-
tus of marriage to a greater extent than the association between moral status and
child welfare. These results suggest some nuanced differences in the use of argu-
mentation based on procreation and welfare of children in the same-sex marriage
debates, and thus complicate the findings of Crehan and Rickbacker (2007) who
combined these concepts into one coding category and found they were particularly
common in articles about same-sex marriage appearing in conservative outlets.
The fact that arguments about the moral status of marriage appeared in less
than a third of the articles demonstrates that public debates over the legal status
of same-sex marriage are not primarily about moral justifications, including the
invocation of religion. However, it is notable that every argumentative dimension
based on conceptions of what is natural was associated with the likelihood of pro-
viding arguments based on moral status. This suggests that the use of naturalness
rhetoric is likely to be associated with religious justification. It is also the case
that review of the text coded for each of the argumentative dimensions revealed
that naturalness rhetoric was used more often to oppose same-sex marriage than
to support it; welfare of children was the only coding category that approached
parity.
Somerville (2005) cautions that facile comparisons of the debates over same-
sex marriage to the history of miscegenation law in the United States can lead us to
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overlook the ways race and sexuality have been mutually linked in the law. Thus it
is notable that in this sample of articles concerning same-sex marriage, mentions
of race were just as prevalent as those concerning the welfare of children, and
more prevalent than those based on procreation. Review of the excerpts coded for
race revealed that many invoked a symbolic comparison between the movements
for legal same-sex marriage and racial struggles—not only to the struggle for
interracial marriage but also to end segregation and even slavery—to legitimize
the political cause of same-sex couples. Very rarely did text coded for mentions
of race include any discussion of people who experience inequality based on both
race and sexuality. Arguments that liken same-sex marriage to movements to end
racial discrimination often do so to affirm the justness of their cause. However,
because the race is invoked in a symbolic way rather than in discussion of families
or couples, this usage obscures the fact that some members of sexual minority
groups are also people of color who face discrimination and stigma that cannot
be ameliorated by the legalization of same-sex marriage (Farrow, 2007). Conse-
quently these race-based arguments run the risk of reinforcing racial privilege at
the same time they ostensibly challenge privilege based on heterosexuality.
The results of this study must be understood in the context of the project’s
limitations. First, no systematic attempt was made to code the news stories as either
supporting or challenging same-sex marriage, as most of the articles attempted
to present a balanced perspective on the issue and thus included multiple and
conflicting perspectives (Li & Liu, 2010). Thus, these results cannot be understood
as characterizing either the supporters or the challengers of same-sex marriage.
Rather, our study provides a snapshot of the public debate as it was represented in
mainstream newspapers at one historical moment. Public opinion on the issue of
marriage rights has shown some change over time [particularly among the young,
and particularly in California (Lewis & Gossett, 2008)]. Similarly, the contours
of this debate may be expected to take different forms in other states, regions of
the United States, and nations, and thus the findings may not be generalizable to
other contexts.
Presenting social arrangements as natural, such as marriages, family forma-
tions, or gendered divisions of labor, diverts attention from injustice and inequality
and suggests that change is neither possible nor desirable. Moreover, naturalness
rhetoric almost invariably reinforces certain statuses as privileged, even when
invoked in an effort to challenge sexuality-based privilege. Notably, welfare of
children arguments in support of same-sex marriage often asserted that children
would benefit most from a two-parent family structure, regardless of the parents’
gender. This rhetoric implicitly privileges two-parent families over single parent
families. Naturalness discourses work together to privilege particular sexual pair-
ings and familial arrangements, and they may make privilege less visible because
inequality comes to be seen as not only inevitable, but appropriate. Our findings
indicate that naturalness arguments are common to the public debates on same-sex
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marriage, appearing in half the articles sampled from major newspapers; in fact,
they are more common than arguments about the moral status of such unions. In-
deed, review of the coded texts presented here suggests that naturalness arguments
are so prevalent, so difficult to refute because they are typically based on assertion
rather than evidence, and also so multifaceted, that they may obviate the need for
arguments about morality, religion and scripture in public debate about same-sex
marriage.
Greene (2009) argued “marriages across forbidden social lines are intrinsi-
cally disruptive because they challenge not only the validity of the categories
themselves, but the hierarchies of privilege and disadvantage the categories are
presumed to legitimize” (p. 701). The rhetoric of the natural forcefully pushes
back against these incursions by using apparently simple arguments that tap
deep-seated psychological mechanisms of essentialism. Because the institution
of marriage “works as a public ordering device,” structuring “citizenship and ex-
clusion,” (Novkov, 2008, p. 361), understanding the rhetorical mechanisms used
to legitimate exclusionary marriage policies is centrally important to challenging
the exclusionary features of these policies.
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